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Abstract This paper measures the impact of the entry of large supermarkets on
incumbents of various sizes. Contrary to the conventional notion that big stores drive
small rivals out of the market, data from Tokyo in the 1990s show that large super-
markets’ entry induces the exit of existing large and medium-size competitors, but
improves the survival rate of small supermarkets. These findings highlight the role of
store size as an important dimension of product differentiation. Size-based entry reg-
ulations would appear to protect big incumbents, at the expense of small incumbents
and potential entrants.
Keywords Deregulation · Entry and exit · Product differentiation · Retail
JEL Classification L11 · L13 · L51 · L81
1 Introduction
This paper empirically assesses the impact of large supermarkets’ entry on existing
supermarkets of various sizes. Contrary to the conventional notion that big stores
drive small rivals out of the market, the results indicate that big entrants drive out big
and medium-sized incumbents, while benefiting small stores. The outcome is consis-
tent with economic theories of product differentiation; i.e., store size is providing an
important dimension to differentiate among retailers.
The deregulation of the Tokyo supermarket industry in the early 1990s provides a
suitable setting to evaluate the differential impacts of large stores’ openings on existing
stores. First, I analyze the incumbent stores’ responses to the entry events by ordered
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probit regressions, where their four alternative actions are (1) exit, (2) shrink floor size,
(3) stay unchanged, and (4) expand floor size. Second, since entry events are based on
big retailers’ choices of towns to enter, this prompts a concern over potential selection
biases. I conduct a series of IV probit regressions in which I instrument the entry
events by the big entrants’ affiliations with particular geographical markets. Finally,
I employ tobit regressions to analyze the magnitude of changes in floor size, using
incumbent stores’ percentage change in floor size as the dependent variable.
The results suggest that large entrants displace large and medium-size incumbents,
but small supermarkets’ survival rate actually improves. Large and medium stores seem
to compete directly with the new rivals, while small incumbents are insulated by prod-
uct differentiation and even benefit from the positive demand externality (additional
flow of shoppers).
These findings have direct public policy implications. Regulators around the globe
often restrict the entry of large retail outlets.1 Such (anti-)competition policies are
often based on the premise that big stores drive out small ones. However, when store
size is the source of differentiation across retail services, the unintended consequences
of size-based entry regulations would appear to include: (1) softer competition among
large retailers, hence limited, pricier choices for consumers on a daily basis; and
(2) forgone profit opportunities for small stores, who could have benefited from the
positive externalities of new big entrants.
2 Literature
This research contributes to three strands of economic literature: First, the paper offers
new empirical evidence to support economic theories of product differentiation, by
comparing the effect of large supermarkets’ entry on competing stores of various
sizes. D’Aspremont et al. (1979), Shaked and Sutton (1982), and Perloff and Salop
(1985) showed that product differentiation could soften price competition.2 However,
as Borenstein and Netz (1999) noted, theoretical work on product differentiation has
produced few corresponding empirical studies. I examine a particular type of product
differentiation in the retail industry: store size. The results highlight the role of product
differentiation in relaxing competition. More specifically, this study supports the the-
oretical prediction by Zhu et al. (2006) that the tradeoff between the business-stealing
effect and the positive demand externality depends on the degree of differentiation
between the entrant and the incumbents.
1 Zoning laws in Britain, France, Germany, India, Japan, Korea, and Poland restrict the development of
large stores (Lewis 2004). Even in the United States, state and local authorities and state courts often make
the final decisions on whether to allow the entry of a new Wal-Mart store (Sobel and Dean 2008).
2 Theoretical predictions vary with respect to the extent of differentiation. For example, D’Aspremont
et al. (1979) show that, in order to soften price competition, two firms would maximally differentiate on
a Hotelling product line. Neven and Thisse (1990) and Irmen and Thisse (1998) extend this framework
to competition over multiple product attributes. In contrast, Anderson et al. (1992) show that firms that
compete in two dimensions may locate together at the center of the market under certain conditions. Still,
the basic insight remains the same: Differentiation opens the possibility for softening competition.
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Second, this paper augments the empirical work on entry and exit, by introducing
the product-differentiation aspect to the analysis in two ways: by examining the dif-
ferential impacts of entry on the exit rates of the incumbents of different sizes; and by
analyzing the incumbents’ responses in terms of store-size changes. It is only recently
that the economics of product differentiation has been studied explicitly in conjunc-
tion with entry and exit. Mazzeo (2002) uses a static framework, while Ellickson
(2007) uses a dynamic structure. This paper takes an alternative approach to capture
the dynamics of the phenomena, by exploiting exogenous regulatory changes and
studying incumbents’ responses to the entry of bigger stores.
Third, this paper sheds new light on the economic analysis of the “Wal-Mart effects;”
i.e., inquiries into the competitive effects of big entrants on incumbents, by introducing
the viewpoint of product differentiation. Shoppers world-wide have witnessed the rise
of big retailers, such as Wal-Mart and Carrefour. The proliferation of these large stores
has stirred the debate over the consequences of their entry into local markets. Some
analysts credit them with lowering prices, raising productivity, and making wider prod-
uct variety available (Hausman and Leibtag 2007; Basker 2005); others blame them
for destroying jobs and local businesses (Wal-Mart Watch 2005). Basker’s (2007) sur-
vey summarizes the discoveries to date and concludes that incumbents’ exit due to
Wal-Mart range between two to five stores at a county level. Detailed panel data of
supermarkets at a sub-county level allow me to address this issue while mitigating
concerns over spurious correlations.3
3 Industry and Data
The supermarket industry in Tokyo in the early 1990s provides a suitable testing ground
for evaluating the impact of large stores’ openings on incumbents’ exit rates for three
reasons: First, stores of various sizes compete in this sector, offering a laboratory
to analyze the differential impacts of large entrants on incumbent stores of different
sizes. Second, it is relatively easy to identify local markets geographically. Unlike
shopping for, say, fashion apparel or consumer electronics, which tends to cluster in
urban centers, shoppers stay close to their home as far as the day-to-day purchase of
food staples is concerned. Third, the (exogenous) relaxation of entry regulations in
1990 allows me to identify the impact of large stores’ entry by comparing the exit
rates of incumbent supermarkets in similar towns with and without an entry event.
3.1 Definition of Supermarket
This study follows the industry standard in defining a supermarket as: (1) a self-
service store, with (2) floor space of at least 231 m2(2, 486 ft2) and/or minimum annual
3 County-level observations may mask the rise and fall of towns; therefore using sub-county-level data
increases the relevance of empirical analysis to actual shopping behavior and competition. Additionally,
stores often change their size over time. If, for instance, a small store expands its floor area, a simple census
might count it as a small store exit and, simultaneously, a medium store entry as if the latter drove out the
former. Panel data are a convenient way to capture actual exit patterns.
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revenue of 100 million ($1 million), and with (3) over 30% of revenue from food
products including (but not limited to) fish, meats, and vegetables.4 My data on super-
markets—based on the Shogyokai’s (1990 & 1995) trade press Japan Supermarket
Directory—contain retail establishments satisfying these conditions.5
Practical meanings of the definition will be clearer in comparison with other retail
formats. Conditions (1) and (2) distinguish supermarkets from more traditional spe-
cialty shops that sell fish, meats, or vegetables, which typically offer customized
services and are smaller in size. Additionally, condition (3) ensures that a supermar-
ket is an outlet primarily for the retailing of food, as distinguished from convenience
stores, drug stores, tobacco shops, or department stores. More recently, a larger super-
market with a wider lineup of household merchandise is often called a GMS (general
merchandise store), hypermart, or superstore. The industry standard does not exclude
these types of supermarkets from the definition; neither does this paper.6 Hence the
likes of Aeon, Daiei, or Seiyu (the Japanese equivalent to Wal-Mart, Tesco, Carrefour,
or Metro) are incorporated in the subsequent empirical analysis.
3.2 Train Station-Centered Geographical Markets
In the suburbs of the Greater Tokyo region (which spans Tokyo, Kanagawa,
Saitama, and Chiba prefectures), relevant geographical markets can be identified by
train stations along major railways (Fig. 1). This is because daily shopping activities in
suburban Tokyo are concentrated around train stations. Since trains are the predomi-
nant means of transport for commuters, stations provide focal points for both shoppers
and retailers (Kawaguchi 1996, p. 175).
Note that 91.7% of the supermarkets shown in Fig. 1 are located within 1.5 km from
a station. Hence, the market database from Toyokeizai’s (a private business press and
think tank) Metropolitan Commercial Map 1995 compiles demographic and retail-
related information by 240 suburban “towns” along major railway lines in the region.7
Each “town” contains a geographical area within a radius of approximately 1.5 km
(0.93 mile) from the train station.
4 This (establishment level) definition of a supermarket is analogous to the one used in the U.S.: “a store
selling a full line of food products and generating at least $2 million in yearly revenues” (Ellickson 2007,
p. 48).
5 For each store, the directory lists its name, street address, year of opening, operating firm, location type,
building structure, parking capacity, gross revenue, types of merchandise sold, floor area, rented area, and
the number of employees.
6 This is also the convention in the U.S. supermarket industry (Ellickson 2007).
7 Metropolitan Commercial Map 1995 contains a number of localities that are better characterized as cen-
tral business districts rather than suburban residential areas. Hence I drop 29 local markets in which the
number of regular commuters exceeds that of residents. I also drop one locality in which the train station
was established only after 1990. Finally, I drop four towns for which the data on train users are unavailable,
and another four towns for which exit rates are not available. All of this leaves 202 towns.
The listed variables include population, the number of households and commuters, the principal means
of transport between residence and the nearest train station, commercial land price, the number of retail
shops, and their aggregate floor space and revenue as of 1991. In addition, the growth rate between 1984
and 1989 of the number of regular commuters is taken from the Institution for Transport Policy Studies’
annual survey (1986 and 1991 issues), directed by the Ministry of Transport.
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Fig. 1 Towns and Railways in the Greater Tokyo Area. Solid lines represent major railway lines. Subway
lines in the central business districts are not shown. Markers represent the locations of large and medium
supermarkets (hence of towns) as of 1994. This map is for illustration purposes only, so some towns analyzed
in this paper are outside this map. However, note that, of the 242 large and medium supermarkets pictured
here, only 20 (or 8.3%) are located far from stations, underlining this paper’s focus on station-centered
“towns.” Source: Toyokeizai (1995)
This disaggregated (and non-administrative) unit of observation is expected to be
the most relevant to the actual grocery shopping pattern, and hence competition, for
three reasons concerning physical structure of transportation, consumers’ shopping
patterns, and supermarkets’ operations.8 First, for a typical railway line, the aver-
age distance between two adjacent suburban stations is 3.8 km (2.4 miles). The 1.5
km-radius towns comfortably split the terrain.
Second, approximately 1 km is the radius for the standard trade area and geographic
market for Japanese supermarkets. The exact distance may vary between 0.9 and 1.5
km depending on town characteristics, but both the Japan Fair Trade Commission
(2005) and numerous industry experts agree on these numbers.
Third, consumer surveys also substantiate the previous point. Most activities of a
typical suburban housewife/husband take place within 0.5 km from her/his dwelling.
So it is unsurprising that urban geographers decided to characterize a daily grocery
shopping as: (1) conducted by a housewife/husband, (2) either on foot or by bicy-
cle, and (3) within 1.5 km from her/his home at maximum (Arai 1996, pp. 58–62;
Kawaguchi 1996, p. 161).
8 Ideally, a formal check of the market definition, such as the SSNIP test, would be desirable for further
assurance. Without detailed household-level information and price data, however, the task of defining local
markets requires some simplifying assumptions (such as mine).
To avoid using existing geographic boundaries (e.g., zip codes or counties), Ellickson and Misra (2008)
resorted to cluster analysis. My approach is similar in spirit, although the need for cluster analysis is pre-
cluded by the focus on train stations. Exact physical features may differ across countries, but the clustering
of stores in my data resonates with their findings in the U.S. data that “these store clusters are somewhat
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Fig. 2 Number of supermarket openings. Note: The number for the year 1955 includes those stores that
opened before 1955. Source: (Minakata 2004, Tables 1–3, p. 16)
3.3 The 1990 Deregulation and Its Historical Context
A priori, there are no natural classification criteria for the sizes of retail outlets. In
the regulatory context of the Japanese retail sector, however, a suitable categorization
arises from the laws that define large, medium, and small stores. The Large-scale Retail
Law, introduced in March 1974, sought to cap the new openings of any retail store
with floor space 1, 500 m2(16, 146 ft2) and up.9 Later, the 1979 revision of the law
further added another target category: stores with 500–1,499 m2 (5,382–16,145 ft2).
This paper defines stores with floor space of 1, 500 m2 and above, 500–1,499 m2, and
less than 500 m2 as “large,” “medium,” and “small,” respectively, because these are
the size categories that had defined the evolution of the sector.10
The new entry of supermarkets was particularly hindered during the 1980s. The
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) tightened the enforcement of the
regulations in October 1981, publicly dissuading retailers from opening new large
stores. Consequently, only small supermarkets could open during this period (Fig. 2:
the period marked by “1” ).
In May 1990, however, some of the prohibitive conditions in the Large-scale Retail
Law were relaxed, which prompted a boom of new large outlets. The regulators began
to accept all of the entry requests, regardless of store sizes, and abolished so-called
“entry control areas” that were previously untouchable for newcomers. The driving
9 This was not the first time that government regulations targeted larger stores. Since the inception of
department stores a century ago, various forms of legal entry barriers existed in Japan. The first was the
Department Store Law, introduced in the 1930s in response to conventional retailers’ political activism.
The law targeted nascent department stores and restricted their entry and operation. See Minakata (2004)
for the industry context.
10 Although the threshold for being “large” (1, 500 m2) is relatively low by international comparison, the
actual size of the large entrants in my study (4, 992 m2, or 53, 716 ft2, on average) is comparable to those
of major supermarkets in other countries including the U.K., where the average store size of supermarket
chains range between 5,800 and 45, 200 ft2 (Smith 2004).
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force behind this policy shift was the pressure from the U.S. government to “liberalize”
Japan’s domestic markets during the trade talks in the late 1980s. One can therefore
regard this entry deregulation as an exogenous change in the industry environment.11
This study focuses on the years immediately after the deregulation (Fig. 2: the period
marked by “2” ) in order to avoid confounding the effects from the subsequent waves
of deregulation.
The exogenous change in regulatory policies allows me to address the timing of big
retailers’ entry. To capture the changes following the 1990 deregulation, I employ the
1990 and 1995 editions of Japan Supermarket Directory, which list the store infor-
mation as of September 1989 and 1994. This sample period gives a sufficient time
interval for observing new entries and incumbents’ responses, which typically take at
least a year or two, while limiting the risk of confounding the effects of various policy
changes in the late 1990s.12 Moreover, five years would allow big retailers to open
some outlets but not in all the promising towns, mainly because of the illiquid nature
of markets for huge properties and credit constraints. The resulting variation across
towns allows me to identify the impact.
3.4 Descriptive Statistics of Towns and Supermarkets
From these two sets of data, I reconstruct the market configuration for each of the
202 localities, by connecting stores’ street addresses to those corresponding to towns.
Table 1 presents summary statistics.
The average town counts 88,957 residents. Tokyo is comparable to other urban areas
in terms of population density. With 4,430 people per km2, it ranks as mere number
128 among the world’s 189 major urban areas.13 Prominent European cities such as
Madrid (5, 680/km2), Athens (5, 500/km2), London (5, 290/km2), and Barcelona
(5, 210/km2) surpass Tokyo. In short, Tokyo is not Hong Kong (25, 740/km2).
The growth potential of demand is proxied by the growth rate between 1984 and
1989 of the number of “regular commuters,”14 the sample mean of which is 16.4%.
There are on average 1,162 retail shops of all categories, with total floor space of
72, 800 m2 (783, 619 ft2). I intend to measure the “depth” of demand by total retail
revenue per capita (which averaged 1.35 million, or $13,500), which reflects the
extent of shoppers from outside the town and other household characteristics such as
income and taste. In 1989, a typical local market had 1.50 small, 1.77 medium, and
1.25 large food supermarkets.
11 Even if the Japanese retailers had exercised considerable bargaining power over the timing and the extent
of the entry deregulation, the analysis and conclusion of this paper would remain unchanged. In that case,
the results would actually underestimate the true impact of new entry because the incumbents, who were in
a position to influence the policy change, should have been better prepared than otherwise for the intensified
competition from new entrants. This direction of bias would not favor my result.
12 An “entry” is the opening for business in my data set. The majority of the entries occurred in the first
half of the 1990–1994 interval. The latest entry events occurred in April 1994. I confirmed that dropping
the two towns (out of 27) that experienced entries in 1994 does not alter the results materially.
13 Wikipedia, accessed on August 13, 2009.
14 Train users with fixed-route commutation tickets for one month or longer (teiki-ken).
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Table 1 Summary statistics for town characteristics
Variable Observation Mean Standard
deviation
Minimum Maximum
Population growth rate (%) 202 16.4 20.6 -15.6 135.5
Population 202 88,957 33,956 13,766 182,590
Retail revenue per capita (mn yen) 202 1.35 0.96 0.22 9.56
Num. retail shops 202 1,162 758 197 4,704
Retail floor area (m2) 202 72,800 46,385 10,471 345,600
Num. incumbents: large 202 1.25 1.13 0.00 6.00
Num. incumbents: medium 202 1.77 1.35 0.00 6.00
Num. incumbents: small 202 1.50 1.48 0.00 6.00
Following the regulatory thresholds, store size categories are defined based on floor area (Small: 1–499 m2,
medium: 500–1,499 m2, and large: 1,500 m2 or larger)
The outcome variable of interest is the incumbent supermarkets’ responses between
1989 and 1994: exit, shrink, stay unchanged, or expand. Table 2 displays the store-level
descriptive statistics.
Out of the 912 incumbent supermarkets in 1989, 94 exited, leaving 818 stores in
1994. Those who survived expanded their floor size by 2.9% on average. There were
252 large, 358 medium, and 302 small incumbents in 1989. Across all stores, 10%
exited, 15% expanded, and 10% shrank their floor sizes (“stay unchanged” is the
omitted category that accounts for the remaining 65%). These percentages do not vary
much by size although small stores are slightly more likely to exit (16%).
4 Empirical Analysis
This section presents the findings from three sets of empirical analyses: (1) ordered
probit regressions of incumbents’ decisions to exit, shrink, stay unchanged, or expand
(Sect. 4.1); (2) the set of similar (binary) probit regressions with geographical instru-
ments for big entrants’ town choice (Sect. 4.2); and (3) tobit regressions of incumbents’
change in floor space (Sect. 4.3).
In all of the specifications, the identification of the entry effects on incumbents
relies on the following two features of the study. First, the framework assumes inde-
pendent local markets in which the following three events occur: (1) The incumbent
supermarkets of various sizes, without knowledge of the entry deregulation, operate
from before 1990;15 (2) Upon the deregulation in 1990, the potential (big) entrants
observe the existing store configuration in all local markets and choose towns to enter;
and (3) The incumbents observe the actual entrants and decide by 1994 whether to
continue in business (and if so, whether to change own store size). These timing and
15 It is reasonable to assume a lack of anticipation because most incumbents had opened by the mid 1980s,
long before the U.S.-Japan trade talks started discussing the retail deregulation.
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Table 2 Summary statistics for store-level observations
Variable Observation Mean Standard
deviation
Minimum Maximum
1. All incumbent stores
Floor Size in 1989 (m2) 912 1,908 3,078 57 27,413
Floor Size in 1994 (m2) 818 2,024 3,221 62 27,413
Change in floor size (%) 818 2.9 29.4 −74.7 53.2
Indicator: Exit 912 .10 .30 0 1
Indicator: Expansion 912 .15 .36 0 1
Indicator: Shrinkage 912 .10 .30 0 1
Indicator: treatment (Large Entrant) 912 .11 .31 0 1
2. Large incumbent stores
Floor size in 1989 (m2) 252 5,199 4,350 1,508 27,413
Floor size in 1994 (m2) 236 5,332 4,488 735 27,413
Change in floor size (%) 236 −0.3 16.3 −74.7 179.0
Indicator: exit 252 .06 .24 0 1
Indicator: expansion 252 .19 .39 0 1
Indicator: shrinkage 252 .12 .32 0 1
Indicator: treatment (large entrant) 252 .11 .31 0 1
3. Medium incumbent stores
Floor size in 1989 (m2) 358 948 306 500 1,499
Floor size in 1994 (m2) 328 969 383 390 3,800
Change in floor size (%) 328 4.0 35.0 −65.4 503.2
Indicator: exit 358 .08 .28 0 1
Indicator: expansion 358 .16 .37 0 1
Indicator: shrinkage 358 .14 .35 0 1
Indicator: treatment (large entrant) 358 .12 .32 0 1
4. Small incumbent stores
Floor size in 1989 (m2) 302 300 135 57 499
Floor size in 1994 (m2) 254 313 141 62 895
Change in floor size (%) 254 4.3 30.9 −33.3 383.2
Indicator: exit 302 .16 .37 0 1
Indicator: expansion 302 .10 .30 0 1
Indicator: shrinkage 302 .04 .19 0 1
Indicator: treatment (large entrant) 302 .09 .28 0 1
Following the regulatory thresholds, store size categories are defined based on floor area (Small: 1–499 m2,
medium: 500–1,499 m2, and large: 1,500 m2 or larger)
informational assumptions are motivated by the historical/institutional background of
the industry (see Sect. 3).
Second, the data set contains observations of similar towns (and individual stores
within each of them) with and without entry events, both before (1989) and after
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Table 3 Ordered probit regressions of decision to Exit < Shrink < Unchanged < Expand
Dep. var.: Decision to Exit < Shrink < Stay Unchanged < Expand
(1) (2) (3)
Treated: large 0.03 (.30) −0.82 (.46)* −0.73 (.47)
Treated: medium −0.56 (.20)*** −0.74 (.22)*** −0.79 (.22)***
Treated: small 0.28 (.17)* 0.23 (.16) 0.22 (.20)
Treated * floor 1.69e−4 (0.81e−4)** 1.49e−4 (0.80e−4)*
Floor 1.28e−5 (1.4e−5) 1.44e−5 (1.48e−5)
Large 0.29 (.10)*** 0.23 (.13)* 0.23 (.13)*
Medium 0.23 (.10)** 0.22 (.10)** 0.22 (.10)**
Constant (=Small) – – –
Controls No No Yes
Instruments No No No
Observations 912 912 912
Pseudo R2 .01 .01 .02
Standard errors (clustered by 202 towns) in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
*** significant at 1%
(1994) the entry deregulation. This variation in data, together with the institutional
background, allows me to identify the impact of big entrants on existing supermarkets.
4.1 Ordered Probit: Exit, Shrink, Stay Unchanged, or Expand
The first set of results is based on ordered probit regressions (Table 3). The dependent
variable is the four discrete alternatives for an incumbent: (1) exit; (2) stay and shrink;
(3) stay unchanged; or (4) stay and expand, ordered in this manner.





exit if y∗i ≤ c1
shrink size if c1 < y∗i ≤ c2
stay unchanged if c2 < y∗i ≤ c3
expand size if c3 < y∗i ,
(1)
where c1, c2, and c3 are threshold parameters. I specify the latent variable y∗i repre-
senting incumbent supermarket i’s profit as
y∗i = αSIZEi + βSIZEi Di + Xiγ + εi , (2)
where Di is the dummy variable that indicates the entry of a new big supermarket
(“treatment” ) in the town in which store i operates.
The vector Xi includes the following town characteristics: Population growth rate
between 1984 and 1989, Population, Retail revenue per capita, the Number of retail
shops (of any kind), and Retail floor area, (i.e., the town’s total floor space that was
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dedicated to retail trade).16 It also incorporates the number of existing rival supermar-
kets in the town as of summer 1989, specified as a linear combination of the numbers
of large, medium, and small incumbents, and their squared terms.17 The error term εi
is i.i.d. standard normal.
Large, medium, and small incumbents may have different intercepts, αSI Z Ei , where
SI Z Ei ∈ {large, medium, small}, with small as the omitted category. The coeffi-
cients of interest are the effects of new entry, βSI Z Ei , which are also allowed to vary
by size classes of incumbents.18
The estimation results in Table 3 suggest that the entry of new large supermar-
kets negatively affects large and medium incumbents, whereas the impact tends to
be positive for small ones.19 Column (1) is the simplest specification with the entry
dummy variable and incumbents’ size classes (large, medium, and small).
In addition to the three size classes, column (2) incorporates incumbents’ floor space
(in m2 as of 1989) together with its interaction term ( Floor and Treated * Floor),
controlling for potential heterogeneity within each category. The positive coefficient
estimates on this detailed size measure suggest that, within each size class, larger
stores tend to fare better.
Finally, column (3) controls for the town characteristics (Xi in Eq. (2)). In all of
the specifications, the impact on medium stores is negative and statistically significant
at 1% level. Negative impact on large stores and positive impact on small stores are
less precisely estimated but consistently appear across all specifications (except for
the case of large stores in column (1)).
4.2 Geographical Instruments for Entrants’ Town Choice
Potential selection biases are a cause of concern: It may be that the big-box stores were
able to foresee the towns where incumbents were most likely to exit. In that case, the
negative impacts on large and medium incumbents could be over-estimated (in mag-
nitude), while the positive impacts on small incumbents might be under-estimated
(again, in magnitude).
To address this issue of potential selection on unobservables, I construct instru-
mental variables (for the big entrants’ choices of town to enter) based on the following
industry characteristics: Each chain retailer usually operates within predetermined
geographic areas, which leaves only a subset of the total of the 202 towns in that
16 Except for Population growth rate, the values at the beginning of the deregulation are used. Each vari-
able’s squared term is also included, to capture possible nonlinearities in the way that the town characteristics
affect the outcome variables. More flexible specifications would be preferable in principle, but the relatively
small sample size limits the extent of higher-order polynomials.
17 An alternative specification that uses dummy variables was also tried (unreported), but does not mate-
rially alter the results.
18 Although there is no theoretical reason a priori for ordering shrink ≺ unchanged ≺ expand, I proceed
with this particular ordering because it fits the data best.
19 I also run the same ordered probit regressions separately for each of the three size classes (unreported).
The results are qualitatively similar but less precisely estimated due to smaller samples. An F-test of a null
hypothesis βlarge = βmedium = βsmall is rejected at the 1% level, which indicates that the entry effects are
indeed different across incumbents’ size classes.
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firm’s choice set for entry. In particular, two different urban structures are relevant:
(1) railway lines; and (2) prefectures.
Regarding railways, many of the major retailers are closely affiliated with particular
railway lines and their train operators. Some retailers are the grocery-store divisions
of the conglomerates that also own and operate railway and property businesses.20
The institutional context is as follows: First, the railway transport enterprise involves
massive property investment, in both land strips beneath railroads and train station
structures. Second, over time, the train operators diversified into real estate broker-
age/development activities and retail services due to strong complementarities that
surround property deals. Third, since location is central to successful retail services,
major retailers either are engaged in close connections with railway/property conglom-
erates or are parts of such entities themselves. It is therefore not surprising that the
chain operators tend to open big stores along their affiliated railway lines, exploiting
informational advantages in local real estate markets.21
With respect to prefectures, a chain retailer is often rooted in a certain prefecture as a
matter of geographic origin. In addition to the informational advantages in local prop-
erty markets, geographic familiarity brings two benefits. First, geographical proximity
to its supplier/distribution networks facilitates the arrangement of logistics. Second,
the familiarity with local rules (such as ordinances) ensures low probabilities of legal
and/or political disruptions in opening new big stores. Therefore, the propensity of
entry is higher when a town belongs to a major retailer’s prefecture of origin.22
I identify each big retailer’s geographic specialization from the Appendices of the
Metropolitan Commercial Map (Toyokeizai 1995) and various issues of Large-scale
Retail Shops Directory (an annual publication also from Toyokeizai). Two sets of IVs
are constructed: (IV-1) the number of big retail firms that operate along each railway
line, and prefecture dummy variables; and (IV-2) the same railway-based IVs, and the
number of big retail firms that operate from each prefecture.
Due to the institutional background in the above, a potential entrant enjoys sig-
nificant informational and cost advantages when opening a new store in its familiar
geographic areas (either along specific railway lines, in certain prefectures, or both).23
Thus, towns that happen to be located in the “backyards” of many big-box operators
(i.e., towns that are located along railway lines and prefectures that are home to many
big retailers) are more likely to experience entry events, for economic mechanisms
20 Examples include Odakyu, Keio, Tokyu, Keikyu, Seibu, and Tobu. See Masuda (2002) for the historical
background on the railway networks and urban development in Tokyo.
21 This advantage of an entrant is uncorrelated with incumbents’ decisions to exit or change floor size
because it is a strictly private benefit. Let us also note that such an informational clout does not translate
into an entrant’s ability to “kick out” incumbents (by means other than product-market competition). See
Masuda (2002) for the close interaction between the railway transport, real estate, and retail businesses.
22 This instrumentation strategy is similar in spirit to the one employed in the Wal-Mart literature: A loca-
tion’s physical distance from the company’s headquarter in Bentonville, Arkansas, predicts the likelihood
and timing of new store openings in that town (see Basker 2007).
23 See Sect. 3 for the details of the urban structure in the Greater Tokyo region. One rationale for such local
specializations and informational advantages is the illiquid nature of markets for huge properties, which
creates an environment characterized by imperfect information.
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that are unrelated to the likelihood of incumbents’ exit or expansion (i.e., the outcome
variables of interest).
Table 4 shows the results of binary IV-probit regressions. Ordered IV-probit regres-
sions may achieve higher efficiency, in principle, but the actual estimation would
become computationally expensive. As a logically consistent alternative method, I
conduct three binary IV-probit regressions that divide an incumbent’s four choices
differently: (Panel-A) “exit” or “shrink/unchanged/expand;” (Panel-B) “exit/shrink”
or “unchanged/expand;” and (Panel-C) “exit/shrink/unchanged ” or “expand.”
For each of Panels A, B, and C, columns (1), (2), and (3) use no IV, while (4)
and (5) use IV-1 and IV-2, respectively. The results are qualitatively similar across
columns and panels: An entry’s impact is negative on large and medium incumbents
but positive on small ones. The order of magnitude is also similar. Thus, the potential
issue of selection on unobservables is unlikely to be driving my baseline findings using
ordered probit (Sect. 4.1).
4.3 Tobit: Percentage Change in Incumbents’ Floor Size
In the preceding analyses, I characterize incumbents’ decisions as discrete choice
problems. However, changes in floor size take continuous values. Some incumbents
more than double their floor spaces by converting one-story buildings into two-story
ones, while others increased their sizes only 10% by renting adjacent spaces in a
commercial complex. Similarly, stores shrink floor sizes by different degrees.
In this section, I incorporate such heterogeneity in incumbents’ size changes by
employing tobit regressions. The dependent variable is the realized percentage change






−100 if y∗i ≤ c1
y∗i if c1 < y∗i ≤ c2
0 if c2 < y∗i ≤ c3
y∗i if c3 < y∗i ,
(3)
The latent variable is the desired percentage change in floor space between 1989 and
1994. The underlying economic model assumes some fixed sunk costs that a store
must incur when changing its floor size (i.e., when yi = 0).
Recall that almost two-thirds of the incumbents stay unchanged, hence the depen-
dent variable has a mass of observations at yi = 0. For this reason, I explicitly include
yi = 0 as a separate case in Eq. (3), which makes this censored regression different
from the standard tobit.
I address the issue of lumpy observations by analyzing the exit/shrink and expansion
decisions separately.24 First, I concentrate on the floor reduction decision by running
two-sided tobit where the focus is on the cases with c1 < y∗i ≤ c2. The percentage
24 More fundamentally, there is no theoretical reason to impose symmetry between shrinkage and expansion


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































change in floor space is left-censored at −100 (i.e., exit) and right-censored at 0, the
latter of which encompasses stores’ decisions to both “stay unchanged” and “expand.”
Second, I exclusively analyze the floor expansion decision by conducting one-sided
tobit where I focus on the cases with c3 < y∗i . Here the percentage change in floor
space is left-censored at 0 and not right-censored.
Table 5 presents two-sided tobit estimation results on incumbents’ decisions to
shrink floor space. Here again, large and medium supermarkets respond “negatively”
to the new entry of large rivals by shrinking their own size, or by exiting the town
altogether. In contrast, small supermarkets are less inclined to shrink or exit.
Table 6 tells a similar story regarding the floor expansion decision of incumbents.
Medium stores tend not to expand their shopping space, followed by large incumbents
to a lesser degree. Again, small supermarkets seem to respond more “aggressively”
by expanding their size although coefficients are not very precisely estimated.
4.4 Discussion
The basic finding from these empirical analyses is that the entry of new large rivals
affect incumbents differently depending on the latter’s sizes. In other words, incum-
bents of different sizes face different incentives in responding to the entry shock.
This simple observation implies that large, medium, and small supermarkets offer
differentiated services from the perspective of consumers. Hence the results high-
light the role of product differentiation in relaxing competition, which is the common
insight from numerous theoretical studies (see Sect. 2).
How do supermarkets’ retail services differ by store sizes? The most important
differentiation mechanism is that, while larger supermarkets offer a wider variety of
merchandise for weekend shopping trips, consumers use their nearest (often small)
supermarkets for quick, daily purchase of fresh foods (fish, vegetables, and meats).
The latter is the principal mode of shopping in Tokyo.
Three demand-side factors may explain the high frequency of fresh-food shopping.
First, houses (and therefore refrigerators) are small in Tokyo, leaving no storage space.
Second, many Japanese are obsessed with the freshness of meat, vegetables, and espe-
cially fish. Third, the female labor-force participation rate is lower in Japan than in
most developed economies, so that there are still many “professional” housewives.
The most intriguing feature of the estimation results is that small incumbents are
not just insulated from the increased competition at the top end of the size spectrum.
Small supermarkets seem to benefit from the entry of new big rivals. An economic
interpretation of this finding would need to rely on some sort of positive externalities
from the new entrant. Since it is not very conceivable to imagine new entrants directly
facilitating small incumbents on the supply side, the positive externalities likely come
from the demand side.
One example is the increased traffic of shoppers in town, attracted by new big retail-
ers. Such is the theoretical model of Zhu et al. (2006), which incorporates both product
differentiation and positive demand externality of new entry in the retail context. My
findings fit well with their prediction that the tradeoff between the business-steal-
ing effect (i.e., increased competition from new entrants) and the positive demand
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Does Big Drive Out Small? 19
externality (i.e., increased demand thanks to new entrants) hinges on the degree of
differentiation between entrants and incumbents.
Existing large and medium supermarkets suffer higher exit rates because they
directly compete with the new big rivals at the same end of the store-size spectrum.
Small supermarkets, in contrast, stand at the other end of the product space, serving
different demands, and are thus insulated from the business-stealing effect of the new
entry. On average, the small incumbents benefit from the entrants probably because
the latter attracts an additional flow of shoppers to the neighborhood.
Aside from the decisions to exit, incumbents’ incentives in changing store size seem
quite nuanced in some size categories. First, the incentive for medium supermarkets
not to expand is understandable. They already suffer from the proximity (in size) to
the new competitor. There is no reason to spend their shrinking profits to get even
closer in size to their big rivals.
Second, the story could be more complicated for large incumbents. On the one
hand, they, too, may want to follow medium stores’ strategy and distance themselves
from the new entrants by shrinking floor space. On the other hand, however, large
incumbents already belong to roughly the same size segment as new entrants, where
their central appeal to consumers is to offer the widest variety of merchandises in
town.
Hence, it would not be totally surprising if some of them choose to expand floor
space, in an effort to regain their former position as the champion of one-stop shop-
ping. They would race to the top end of the size spectrum to attract weekend shoppers
back. I suspect that this mixture of incentives to shrink and expand might lie behind
the estimation results on large incumbents, which are generally negative but not as
precisely estimated as the response of medium stores.
Finally, why do the small supermarkets expand? Two mechanisms may possibly
be at work. One is that the increased exits among medium stores leave some niche
on the size spectrum. Even though it seems risky to become closer in size to the new
big entrants, small stores’ initial positions are so distant from the high end of the
product space that they might be able to capture the now under-served customer seg-
ment, without serious concerns over direct competition with the big entrant. The other
possible reasoning is that the arrival of the new product (i.e., big-box retail service)
somehow shifts upwards the entire product space effectively demanded by shoppers.
The latter mechanism is reminiscent of Sutton’s (1991) endogenous sunk cost theory.
These explanations are not mutually exclusive.
These potentially complicated incentives of floor shrinkage/expansion seem to
suggest room for further investigation—both theoretical and empirical—on product
differentiation in conjunction with entry and exit.
5 Conclusion
Instead of driving out small rivals, large entrants seem to improve their survival pros-
pects. This paper presents new evidence that supports the economic theory of prod-
uct differentiation, and introduces the perspective of product differentiation to the
empirical analysis of entry and exit.
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I conduct ordered and IV probit regressions of each incumbent store’s responses
(i.e., exit, stay and shrink, stay unchanged, or stay and expand). The results suggest
that, even after accounting for both the (ordered) discrete nature of the decision prob-
lem and the potential issue of new entrants’ town selection based on the unobservable
town characteristics, the main findings stand out: Large and medium incumbents are
adversely affected by the new entries of big rivals, whereas small incumbents seem to
benefit from them. The results from tobit regressions on the percentage change of floor
space further confirms this contrast between large, medium, and small supermarkets.
These findings imply that store size functions as a key dimension of product differ-
entiation among retailers.25 On the one hand, large and medium incumbents compete
as closer substitutes to new large entrants. On the other hand, small supermarkets—
thanks to a sufficient degree of differentiation—benefit from the increased traffic of
shoppers that is generated by the entrants.
Consequently, this research critically examines the conventional notion that big
drives out small, a notion that continues to motivate size-based entry regulations in
many economies, both developed and emerging. Ironically, such policies appear to
shield big retailers from competition and even preclude small stores from enjoying the
increased customer flow that can be generated by large new entrants. The specifics of
geographical and regulatory setting may differ by country and region, but these basic
economic forces of product differentiation and entry/exit are likely to be at play in
many markets.
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